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Abstract
Consider the communication efficient secret sharing problem. A dealer wants to share a secret with n parties such that
any k ≤ n parties can reconstruct the secret and any z < k parties eavesdropping on their shares obtain no information about
the secret. In addition, a legitimate user contacting any d , k ≤ d ≤ n, parties to decode the secret can do so by reading and
downloading the minimum amount of information needed.
We are interested in communication efficient secret sharing schemes that tolerate the presence of malicious parties
actively corrupting their shares and the data delivered to the users. The knowledge of the malicious parties about the secret
is restricted to the shares they obtain. We characterize the capacity, i.e., maximum size of the secret that can be shared. We
derive the minimum amount of information needed to to be read and communicated to a legitimate user to decode the secret
from d parties, k ≤ d ≤ n. Error-correcting codes do not achieve capacity in this setting. We construct codes that achieve
capacity and achieve minimum read and communication costs for all possible values of d . Our codes are based on Staircase
codes, previously introduced for communication efficient secret sharing, and on the use of a pairwise hashing scheme used
in distributed data storage and network coding settings to detect errors inserted by a limited knowledge adversary.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing [1], [2] consists of a dealer who wants to share a secret with n parties such that any subset of z < n
parties eavesdropping on their shares obtain no information about the secret. Besides its application to privately storing
information in a distributed storage system, e.g., [3], secret sharing is the main tool used in several applications of
distributed systems such as private coded computing, e.g., [4], [5], private information retrieval [6] and secure multi-party
computations [7]. The main challenge arising in distributed systems is tolerating the presence of slow or unresponsive
nodes, referred to as stragglers in the distributed computing community [8]. Classical secret sharing [1], [2] mitigates the
stragglers by allowing a legitimate user to decode the stored information from any subset of nodes of a predetermined
size k, z < k ≤ n.
However, in many applications the number of stragglers is not know a priori. Therefore, communication efficient secret
sharing is a better fit for this problem. Communication efficient secret sharing (CE-SS) introduced in [9] allows a user to
decode the secret from any d , k ≤ d ≤ n parties while communicating the minimum amount of information needed to
decode the secret. The amount of information communicated to the user using CE-SS is always less than or equal to the
amount of information communicated when using classical secret sharing. As a direct application, CE-SS reduces the
aggregate delays experienced by the dealer in private coded computing [5].
We are interested in communication efficient secret sharing schemes that tolerate the presence of malicious parties
trying to actively corrupt the data stored in the distributed system. One direct solution is to use CE-SS Reed-Solomon
type codes such as the codes introduced in [10], [11]. However, such error-correction codes assume that the malicious
parties are omniscient and know the secret stored in the system. This assumption does not hold in this setting where the
goal is to maintain the privacy of the dealer’s data. This type of adversary is known as limited-knowledge adversary in the
literature [3], [12].
Related works: Communication efficient secret sharing problem is introduced in [9]. The minimum communication cost
as function of the number of stragglers is derived in [9], [11] and codes achieving the bound are given in [9]–[11], [13].
On the other hand, protecting distributed systems from limited-knowledge malicious adversary is studied in different
settings. In [12], [14] the authors consider a network coding setting in which the adversary can corrupt the data sent
through some of the network’s nodes and derive the capacity of such system. Reliable distributed storage system under
repair dynamics is studied in [3], [15]. The authors of [3] derive the capacity of reliable and secure distributed storage
systems under the repair dynamics. Capacity-achieving codes are provided in [3], [15]. The introduced codes are based on
codes for non-reliable storage systems coupled with the pairwise hashing scheme introduced in [14]. In both settings, it is
shown that leveraging the limitation of the adversary’s knowledge leads to increasing the capacity of the system [3], [12],
[15], [16].
Contributions: We study the problem of reliable communication efficient secret sharing. We derive the capacity of such
systems, i.e., the maximum size of the secret that can be reliably and privately stored in a distributed system in the
presence of an unknown number of stragglers and a limited-knowledge adversary eavesdropping on the data and actively
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Party 1 Party 2 Party 3 Party 4
s1+s2+ r1 s1+2s2+4r1 s1+3s2+4r1 s1+4s2+ r1
r1+ r2 r1+2r2 r1+3r2 r1+4r2
Table I: The Staircase secret sharing code for n = 4, k = 3, z = 1 and achieves minimum communication cost for d ′ = 2 and
d ′ = 3 over F25.
trying to corrupt the stored data. We characterize the minimum amount of information that the user has to download to
decode the secret as a function of the number of stragglers, number of eavesdropped nodes, and number of corrupted
nodes. We provide codes that achieve capacity and the minimum communication cost for any number of stragglers.
Our codes are based on the use of Staircase codes and a pairwise hashing scheme that allows the user to detect the
malicious parties. We compare the derived capacity to the error-correction capacity of the system with privacy constraints,
i.e., assuming the adversary corrupting the contents of the shares is omniscient. As a result, we show that leveraging
the limitation of the adversary’s knowledge increases the capacity of the system. We illustrate the ideas in the following
Example.
Example 1. We construct a reliable communication efficient secret sharing with n = 4 parties. Assume that at most 1 party
can be a straggler, i.e., k = 3 and that the adversary can spy and corrupt the content of 1 party, i.e., z = 1. Let s= (s1,s2) ∈ F2q ,
q ≥ 4, be the secret to be stored. The dealer generates two random numbers r1 and r2 drawn independently and uniformly
at random from Fq and independently from s. The shares given to the parties are computed using Staircase codes [10] and
are shown in table I.
For each party i we denote by wi 1 and wi 2 the first and second part of the share given to that party. We view wi 1 and
wi 2 as vectors in some finite field Fvq1 and denote by 〈wi 1,w j 1〉 the dot product of two vectors wi 1 and w j 1. The dealer
computes the following pairwise hashes hi 1 = (〈wi 1,w j 1〉) for all i 6= j ∈ {1, . . . ,4} and hi 2 = (〈wi 2,w j 2〉) for all i 6= j ∈ {1, . . . ,4}
and sends hi 1 and hi 2 to party i .
Without loss of generality assume that party 1 is controlled by the adversary. A user contacting d = 4 parties downloads
the first half of each share and all the hashes hi 1. Assuming that the size of the hash is negligible compared to the size of
the shares, the communication cost is equal to 4 units of information. Note that the adversary only observes the share of
party 1 and therefore the other shares are uniformly distributed over Fvq1 from his perspective. The user computes hˆi 1 for
i = 1,2,3,4 and compares them to the downloaded hash hi 1. The only corrupted packet here is wˆ11 and can be written as
wˆ11 =w11+e for a given error vector e. Since wi 1 is independent from the adversary’s observation, therefore
Pr(hˆ11 =h11)= Pr(e⊥w21,e⊥w31,e⊥w41)
= Pr(e⊥w21)Pr(e⊥w31|e⊥w21)Pr(e⊥w41|e⊥w21,e⊥w31)
≤ Pr(e⊥w21)
= 1
q v
.
With high probability, the user can construct the following hash comparison table where × denotes that hˆi 1 6=hi 1 and X
denotes equality. The user looks at the row with the most number of × and declares the party corresponding to this row
as corrupted. Note that if the first row had just one ×, say ˆh11 6=h21, the user cannot know whether party 1 or party 2 is
corrupted. This happens with probability at most q−v .
hˆ11 hˆ21 hˆ31 hˆ41
h11 X × × ×
h21 × X X X
h31 × X X X
h41 × X X X
The user deletes the data downloaded from party 1 and decodes the secret using the other downloaded shares. Similarly,
a user contacting any d = k = 3 parties downloads all their shares and does the same as above. The communication cost is 6
units of information and the probability of error is upper bounded by q−v .
In this example, the size of the secret is equal to 2 symbols. A user contacting d = 4 parties reads and downloads 4 units
of information and a user contacting d = 3 parties reads and downloads 6 units of information. The user can detect the
corrupted node and decode the secret with high probability. We show in the sequel that this code is optimal, i.e., the secret
size achieves capacity and the minimum download costs for d = 4 and d = 3 are 4 and 6 units of information, respectively.
Note that the error correction capacity of the system, i.e., if the adversary were omniscient, reduces to 0. From the singleton
bound we know that the amount of information that can be reliably stored in the system is equal to one share. However,
this is exactly the amount of randomness needed to maintain privacy of the data, and therefore the secret can be of size 0.
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II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider the problem of communication efficient secret sharing in the presence of a malicious adversary. In classical
secret sharing setting, the dealer wants to share a secret s with n parties such that a user can decode the secret from
any subset of k ≤ n parties by downloading all their shares. In addition, any subset of zr < k parties should not obtain
any information about the secret. We assume that the share given to each party consists of α symbols each being an
element of a finite field Fq , where q ≥ n is a power of a prime. For the scheme to be communication efficient, we require
that a user contacting d , k ≤ d ≤ n parties can decode the secret by downloading less then k shares. The minimum
communication cost as function of d is given by [9], [11] CC(d)= d (k− zr )α
d − zr
. This implies that the user can tolerate the
presence of n−d stragglers for k ≤ d ≤ n.
The new constraint that we impose here is that up to zw parties can be malicious and can send corrupted data to
a user reconstructing the secret. The adversary James has different control level on the parties. It can eavesdrop on
zr o parties, blindly corrupt (jam) the content of zwo parties, and eavesdrop and corrupt the content of zr w parties. Let
z, (zr o , zwo , zr w ). Note that by definition zr = zr o + zr w and zw = zwo + zr w . We study distributed storage systems that
satisfy the following properties.
a) Perfect privacy: Let s be the secret and let S be the random variable denoting the secret. Let wi be the share
given to party i and let Wi denote the random variable representing wi . For any set B ⊂ {1, . . . ,n}, let WB denote the
shares given to the parties indexed by B, i.e., WB = {Wi ; i ∈B}. The privacy constraint is expressed as
H(S|WZ )=H(S), ∀Z ⊂ [n], |Z | = zr . (1)
Here H is the entropy function and all logarithms are base q .
b) Resiliency: A user contacting k parties and downloading all their shares can decode the secret. The resiliency
requirement can be expressed as
H(S|WA )= 0, ∀A ⊆ [n], |A | = k. (2)
Let sˆ be the secret reconstructed by the user. We relax the condition of zero-error reconstruction and allow a small
probability of error, i.e., for all ε> 0, Pre , Pr(sˆ 6= s)< ε.
c) Communication efficiency: A user contacting any d parties, k ≤ d ≤ n, decodes the secret by reading and downloading
the minimum amount of information.
Note that the read cost is upper bounded by the communication cost since the parties must at least read the amount
of information communicated to the user.
In the sequel, we denote by (n,k,z) a reliable communication efficient secret sharing (R-CE-SS) with n parties, a
threshold on the stragglers equal to n−k and an adversary controlling z parties as defined above. Our goal is to derive
the capacity of an (n,k,z) R-CE-SS. In other words, we want to find the maximum size of the secret s that can be stored
in the distributed system using an (n,k,z) R-CE-SS and provide codes that achieve capacity and minimum download
cost for all number of stragglers. We consider two types of adversaries: limited knowledge adversaries and omniscient
adversaries. The former adversary only observes the information shared with zr parties and corrupt the content of zw
shares. Whereas, the latter has full knowledge of all the shares information and can corrupt the content of zw shares. We
consider omniscient adversary to model the worst case error correction capacity.
III. MAIN RESULTS
Limited knowledge adversary: We characterize the capacity C LK(n,k,z) of an (n,k,z) R-CE-SS scheme and derive the
minimum communication and read costs, CC(d) and RC(d) incurred by a user contacting d parties to decode the secret.
Theorem 1. The capacity of an (n,k,z) R-CE-SS, where z= (zr o , zwo , zr w ), in the presence of a limited knowledge adversary
eavesdropping on zr o shares, blindly corrupting the content of zwo shares and eavesdropping and corrupting the content of
zr w shares is given by
C LK(n,k,z)=
{
(k− zr − zw )α if k > 2zr w +2zwo + zr o ,
0 otherwise.
(3)
The communication and read costs CC(d) and RC(d) incurred by a user contacting d parties to decode the secret are
RC(d)=CC(d)= d (k−2zr w − zwo − zr o)α
d −2zr w − zwo − zr o
. (4)
We construct R-CE-SS codes that achieve C LK(n,k,z) and the minimum costs simultaneously for all values of d , k ≤ q ≤ n.
Our codes are based on the use of Staircase codes [10] and pairwise hash [3], [14].
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Omniscient adversary: We derive the capacity C O(n,k,z) of an (n,k,z) R-CE-SS scheme to show that C LK(n,k,z)>C O(n,k,z).
The capacity in this setting follows from Singleton-type bounds with privacy constrains. We also derive the minimum
communication and read costs, CC(d) and RC(d) incurred by a user contacting d parties to decode the secret.
Theorem 2. The capacity of an (n,k,z) R-CE-SS, where z= (zr o , zwo , zr w ), in the presence of an adversary eavesdropping
on zr o + zr w shares and an omniscient adversary corrupting the content of zwo + zr w shares is given by
C O(n,k,z)=
{
(k− zr −2zw )α if k > 3zr w +2zwo + zr o ,
0 otherwise.
(5)
The communication and read costs CC(d) and RC(d) incurred by a user contacting d parties to decode the secret are
RC(d)=CC(d)= d (k−3zr w −2zwo − zr o)α
d −3zr w −2zwo − zr o
. (6)
Staircase codes [10] and the codes presented in [11] are R-CE-SS codes that achieve C O(n,k,z) and the minimum costs
simultaneously for all values of d , k ≤ q ≤ n.
IV. FLOW GRAPH REPRESENTATION
We look at the problem at hand as a multicast problem on parallel edges. We model the network using a flow graph
G (V ,E ) with V being the set of vertices and E the set of edges. This representation is introduced in [17]. The dealer D is
the source of the network and each user j is a terminal U j . We view each party as being two vertices in the graph, a
vertex P in and P out. The vertex D is connected to P ini with an edge D → P ini of infinite capacity for all i = 1, . . . ,n. For all
i = 1, . . . ,n, the vertex P outi is connected to Pi in with an edge P ini → P outi of capacity equal to α, the storage capacity of
each party. A vertex U j is connected to any set of d vertices P outi , indexed by Ij ⊆ [n], with edges of infinite capacity
P outi →U j for all i ∈Ij . We depict this network in Figure 1.
A cut C (V1,V2) between D and a given user U j in the network is defined as a partition of the set of vertices V into two
sets V1 and V2 such that:
1) By definition of a partition, V = V1∪V2 and V1∩V2 =;.
2) The source D is in V1 and U j is in V2.
3) There is no edge in the network that connects any vertex in V1 to the user U j .
The value of a cut C (V1,V2) is defined as the sum of the capacities of the edges going from a vertex in V1 to a vertex in
V2. The idea is to use the min-cut max-flow to bound the capacity of the network. For example, in the network shown in
Figure 1 the dealer can send at most 2α units of information to user 1. This amount is equal to the value of the cut
C (V1,V2).
D
P in1 P
in
2 P
in
3 P
in
4
P out1 P
out
2 P
out
3 P
out
n
U1 U2
∞ ∞
∞ ∞
α α α α
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
d1 = 2
d2 = 3
C (V1,V2)
Figure 1: A depiction of the graph representation of the reliable communication efficient secret sharing problem with
n = 4 workers and two values of d , d1 = 2 and d2 = 3. The dealer is the source represented by a vertex D. Each party i
is represented by two vertices P ini and P
out
i . A user j is a terminal U j connected to d parties for different values of d .
All edges are directed and the capacity is mentioned on the edge. A cut between the dealer and user 1 is shown where
V2 = {P out1 ,P out2 ,U1} and V1 = V \V2. The value of this cut is 2α.
4
V. CONVERSES
Let α be the amount of information given to each party. We show that H(S)≤ (k−2zr w − zr o − zwo)α using standard
information theoretic inequalities. Then, we use the flow graph information representation of the reliable communication
efficient secret sharing system to show the following.
C (n,k,z)≤
{
k−2zr w − zwo − zr o if k > 2zr w +2zwo + zr o ,
0 otherwise.
(7)
A. Bound on the Entropy of the Secret
Let W ji , i < j , denote the set of random variables Wi , . . . ,W j and recall that zw = zwo + rr w and zr = zr o + rr w . For any
collection of k shares we can write the following using (2)
H(S)= I (S;W k1 ) (8)
= I (S;W zw1 )+ I (S;W kzw+1|W
zw
1 ) (9)
= I (S;W kzw+1|W
zw
1 ) (10)
=H(W kzw+1|W
zw
1 )−H(W kzw+1|S,W
zw
1 )
=H(W kzw+zr+1|W
zw
1 )
+H(W zw+zrzw+1 |W
zw
1 ,W
k
zw+zr+1)−H(W kzw+1|S,W
zw
1 ) (11)
≤H(W kzw+zr+1) (12)
≤ (k−2zr w − zwo − zr o)H(Wi ) (13)
= (k−2zr w − zwo − zr o)α. (14)
Equation (9) follows from the chain rule of mutual information. Equation (10) follows from the privacy constraint given
in (1). In (10) we removed the first zr o shares which does not incur loss of generality. Equation (11) follows from the
chain rule of entropy. Equation (12) follows from the data processing inequality as we shall show next. Equation (13)
follows from the chain rule of entropy and (14) follows because H(Wi )=α.
To show that (12) holds we use the non-negativity of the entropy and write the following.
H(W kzw+1|S,W
zw
1 )=H(W zw+zrzw+1 |S,W
zw
1 )+H(W kzw+zr |S,W
zw
1 ,W
zw+zr
zw+1 )
≥H(W zw+zrzw+1 |S,W
zw
1 ). (15)
Note that (15) holds with equality because all the shares are a deterministic function of the secret and the randomness
that can be extracted from any zr shares. Let
Q ,H(W zw+zrzw+1 |W
zw
1 ,W
k
zw+zr+1)−H(W kzw+1|S,W
zw
1 ),
we use (15) to bound Q as follows.
Q ≤H(W zw+zrzw+1 |W
zw
1 ,W
k
zw+zr+1)−H(W
zw+zr
zw+1 |S,W
zw
1 )
= I (W zw+zrzw+1 ;S,W
zw
1 )− I (W zw+zrzw+1 ;W
zw
1 ,W
k
zw+zr+1) (16)
≥ 0. (17)
Equation (16) follows from the definition of mutual information I (A;B) = H(A)−H(A|B) and (17) holds because
S →W kzw+zr+1 forms a Markov chain and we can use the data processing inequality.
B. Limited Knowledge Adversary
a) Capacity: We quantify the amount of information that the dealer can send to a user contacting any k parties.
We do so by finding a cut in the network between the dealer and such a user. By the min-cut max-flow argument the
capacity of the system is upper bounded by the value of this cut. We partition the contacted parties into three disjoint
sets. Let R, W and H be three disjoint subsets of [n] such that |R| = zr o , |W | = zr w + zwo and |H | = k− zr o − zwo − zr w .
We denote by PR , PW , PH the set of parties indexed by R, W and H , respectively. Let PR be the set of parties on which
the adversary can eavesdrop (read only), PW be the set of parties which shares can be corrupted by the adversary (write
only and read write) and PH be the set of parties not controlled by the adversary. A cut between the dealer and the user
is V2 = {U ,P outR ,P outW ,P outH } and V2 = V \V1. The value of this cut is kα. We divide the set of outgoing edges to the user into
three sets (see Figure 2 for a pictorial representation):
1) E1: the set of outgoing edges from the parties indexed by R, i.e., the set of edges P ini → P outi for all i ∈R.
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DP in1 · · · P inzr o P inzr o+1 · · · P inzw+zr o P inzw+zr o+1 · · · P inn
P out1 · · · P outzr o P outzr o+1 · · · P outzw+zr o P outzw+zr o+1 · · · P outn
U
α α α α α α
k
C (V1,V2)
Figure 2: Flow graph representation of the reliable communication efficient secret sharing problem. Edges with no capacity
are infinite capacity edges. A dashed P ini means that the adversary can read the share of party i .A dashed P
out
i means
that the adversary can change the data sent from party i to the user. We split the parties into 3 sets, a read-only set
(on the left), a write set (in the middle) and a set where the adversary has no control (on the right). The value of the
considered cut is kα.
2) E2: the set of outgoing edges from the parties indexed by W , i.e., the set of edges P ini → P outi for all i ∈W .
3) E3: the set of outgoing edges from the parties indexed by H , i.e., the set of edges P ini → P outi for all i ∈H .
Let XEi (s) be the symbols sent to the user on the set of edges Ei when a secret s is being transmitted from the
dealer. The information sent to the user on P outi →U depends only on the information sent on P ini → P outi . Therefore
we focus on the links P ini → P outi . We consider two cases depending on the value of k: (i) k ≤ 2zr w +2zwo + zr o ; and
(ii) k > 2zr w +2zwo + zr o .
Case 1: First consider k = 2zr w+2zwo+zr o . The adversary James can decide on a given secret sJ of his choice independently
from the true secret being sent by the dealer and send XE2 (sJ ) on the set of links he controls. The user now observes
XE1 (s), XE2 (sJ ) and XE3 (s). From the user’s perspective all secrets are equally likely because the dealer is choosing a secret
uniformly at random and sending it to the user. Using the upper bound on H (S) we can verify that the uncertainty of the
message to the user and to the adversary is the same and is equal zwoα. Therefore, since |E2| = |E3| and both XE2 (sJ ) and
XE3 (s) are consistent with XE1 (s) and both uniformly distributed over the same alphabet the user cannot decide wether s
or sJ is the true message and must decode the message using only XE1 (s). We formalize this intuition as follows. We
assume that the secret s is uniformly distributed over Fzwoαq . Let r and rJ be the values of the random numbers chosen by
the dealer and James respectively. We can write the following.
Pr
(
XE2 (sJ )= x2, XE3 (s)= x3|XE1 (s)= x1
)= Pr(XE3 (s)= x3)Pr(XE2 (sJ )= x2|XE1 (s)= x1, XE3 (s)= x3)
= Pr(XE3 (s)= x3)Pr(XE2 (sJ )= x2|XE1 (s)= x1) (18)
= Pr(S = s,R = r)Pr(S = sJ ,R = rJ |XE1 (s)= x1)
= Pr(S = s)Pr(R = r)Pr(S = sJ )Pr(R = rJ |XE1 (s)= x1) (19)
= 1
q zwoα
Pr(R = r) 1
q zwoα
Pr
(
R = rJ |XE1 (s)= x1
)
(20)
= Pr(S = sJ )Pr(R = r)Pr(S = s)Pr(R = rJ |XE1 (s)= x1)
= Pr(XE3 (sJ )= x3)Pr(XE2 (s)= x2|XE1 (s)= x1)
= Pr(XE2 (s)= x2, XE3 (sJ )= x3|XE1 (s)= x1) .
Equation (18) holds because the adversary does not observe the information sent on E3. Equation (19) follows because
the dealer chooses the random numbers independently from the secret to ensure privacy. In addition, the information on
sent on E1 contains no information about the secret and James chooses sJ independently from the information sent on
E1 and from the randomness. Equation (20) holds because from the user’s perspective the secret is drawn uniformly at
random from Fzwoαq .
This equality implies that the user cannot distinguish whether E2 or E3 are sending information belonging to the
true secret. The user must therefore decode the secret using only XE1 (s), otherwise the user would be making an error
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with probability 1/2(1−1/q zwoα). However, due to the privacy constraint any set of less than zr o + zr w shares contain no
information about the secret. Therefore, the capacity of the system is 0. A similar argument follows if k < 2zr w +2zwo+zr o .
The adversary sends no information on B ⊂ E2 of size |E2|− |E3| links and the rest follows.
Case 2: This case is straightforward. Assume that the dealer is storing a secret of maximal size H (S)= (k−2zr w−zr o−zwo)α>
zwoα. James can choose a fake secret sJ of size at most zwo = |E2|−zr w . The user observes XE1 (s), XE2 (sJ ) and XE3 (s). Due
to privacy constraints, all true messages are equally likely from James’ perspective. Thus, Jame’s best strategy is to pick
sJ at random. Since James observes the information sent on the links of E1, the information XE2 (sJ ) will be consistent
with XE1 (s). However, with high probability XE2 (sJ ) is not consistent with XE3 (s) for all sJ 6= s. Therefore, the best the user
can do is to detect that the information sent on XE2 (sJ ) is independent from the true secret s and use the remaining
information to decode.
Hence, the amount of information the user can use to decode s is upper bounded by the amount of information sent
on E1 and E3. Due to privacy constraints, any collection of zr o+zr w parties obtain no information about the secret. Thus,
the capacity of the system is upper bounded by
C ≤ |E1|+ |E3|− zr o − zr w = (k−2zr w − zr o − zwo)α.
Note that in this case the user knows that XE2 (sJ ) is the set of corrupted parties with high probability. An error occurs if
there exists a subset A ⊂ E3 of size H (S)−zr w−zwo links such that XE2 (sJ ) 6= XA (s) are both consistent with XE3\A (s). In this
case, the user cannot decide whether XE2 (sJ ) or XA (s) are information that belong to the true secret because all secrets are
also equally distributed from his perspective. The best strategy of the user here is to decode only from E1 and E3 \A . Hence,
the user cannot decode the secret if (k−3zr w −2zwo − zr o)α<H(S) because out of the |E1|+ |E3|− |A | = k−2zr w −2zwo
links any zr o + zr w links cannot have any information about the secret. This case happens with probability bounded by
q−H(S)+zwo+zr w . If the user wants to always decode the right message, then the capacity becomes the same as the capacity
of error correction codes with privacy constraints, i.e., H(S)≤ (k−2(zr w + zwo)− (zr o + rr w ))α.
b) Minimum Download Cost: To obtain an upper bound on the the minimum communication cost between any
d ≤ n parties and the user we assume that each party can communicate at most β≤α units of information to the user.
We consider the case where k > 2zr w +2zwo + zr o . The user downloads dβ units of information from the parties. In a
similar argument to the one used in the converse, the user cannot use the information sent from the zwo + zr w parties
because they send information independent from the secret s. Again, from the privacy constraint the information stored
on (therefore sent from) any collection of zr o+zr w parties does not contain any information about the secret s. Thus, the
user can only use the remaining (d −2zr w − zr o − zwo)β units of information to decode the secret. The useful information
must be at least equal to size of the secret therefore
(d −2zr w − zr o − zwo)β≤ (k−2zr w − zr o − zwo)α,
CC(d)= dβ≤ d (k−2zr w − zr o − zwo)α
d −2zr w − zr o − zwo
(21)
We defer the proof using information theoretic inequalities, following the same steps of Section V-A, to the appendix.
C. Omniscient Adversary
a) Capacity: We quantify the amount of information that the dealer can send to a user contacting any k parties. We
do so by finding a cut in the network between the dealer and such a user. By the min-cut max-flow argument the capacity
of the system is upper bounded by the value of this cut. We partition the contacted parties into three disjoint sets. Let W ,
H1 and H2 be three disjoint subsets of {1, . . . ,n} such that |W | = zr w + zwo , |H1| = zr w + zwo and |H2| = k−2(zr w − zwo).
We denote by PW , PH1 , PH2 the set of parties indexed by R, W and H , respectively. A cut between the dealer and the
user is V2 = {U ,P outW ,P outH1 ,P
out
H2
} and V2 = V \V1. The value of this cut is kα.
Let XW (s), XH1 (s), XH2 (s) be the symbols sent to the user from the set of parties indexing X when a secret s is being
transmitted from the dealer. The adversary decides on a given secret sJ of his choice independently from the true secret
being sent by the dealer and sends XW (sJ ) on the set of links he controls. Since the adversary is omniscient, he can
always choose a secret sJ such that both XW (sJ ) and XH1 (s) are consistent with XH2 (s). The user cannot decide wether s
or sJ is the true message and must decode the message using only XH2 (s). We formalize this intuition as follows. We
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assume that the secret s is uniformly distributed over FH(S)q . Let r and rJ be the values of the random numbers chosen by
the dealer and the adversary respectively. We can write the following.
Pr
(
XW (sJ )= x1, XH1 (s)= x2|XH2 (s)= x3
)= Pr(XH1 (s)= x2)Pr(XW (sJ )= x1|XH1 (s)= x2, XH2 (s)= x3)
= Pr(S = s,R = r)Pr(S = sJ ,R = rJ |XH1 (s)= x2, XH2 (s)= x3)
= Pr(S = s)Pr(R = r)Pr(S = sJ )Pr(R = rJ |XH1 (s)= x2, XH2 (s)= x3)
= 1
q H(S)
Pr(R = r) 1
q H(S)
Pr
(
R = rJ |XH1 (s)= x2, XH2 (s)= x3
)
(22)
= Pr(S = sJ )Pr(R = r)Pr(S = s)Pr(R = rJ |XH1 (s)= x2, XH2 (s)= x3)
= Pr(XW (s)= x1, XH1 (sJ )= x2|XH2 (s)= x3) .
Equation (22) holds because from the user’s perspective the secret is drawn uniformly at random from FH(S)q . This
equality implies that the user cannot distinguish whether W or H1 are sending information belonging to the true secret.
The user must therefore decode the secret using only XH2 (s), otherwise the user would be making an error with probability
1/2. However, due to the privacy constraint any set of less than zr o + zr w shares contain no information about the secret.
Therefore, the capacity of the system is less than or equal to (|H2|− zr o + zr w )α= (k−3zr w −2zwo − zr o)α.
b) Minimum download: We follow the same argument above. Consider a user contacting d parties and consider the
trivial cut V2 = {U }, V1 = V \V2. Each party sends β units of information to the dealer, which we want to minimize. The value
of the cut is dβ. Following the same reasoning as above, we know that the user can use at most (d −3zr w −2zwo − zr o)β
units of information. In order to decode the secret the total amount of useful downloaded information must be greater
than or equal to H(S)= (k−3zr w −2zwo − zr o)α. Therefore, we obtain
(d −3zr w −2zwo − zr o)β≥ (k−3zr w −2zwo − zr o)α,
CC(d)= dβ≥ d (k−3zr w −2zwo − zr o)α
d −3zr w −2zwo − zr o
.
VI. ACHIEVABILITY
A. Limited Knowledge Adversary
1) Capacity achieving codes: To achieve capacity and minimum communication cost we use Staircase codes [10] with a
pairwise hash [3], [14] added to the data given to the parties. Staircase codes is a family of communication efficient secret
sharing that achieves capacity and minimum communication cost for all values of k ≤ d ≤ n when zw = zwo + zr w = 0. To
construct an (n,k,z) R-CE-SS, we need an (n,k ′ = k−zw , z ′ = zr ) Staircase code that achieves the minimum communication
cost for d ′ ∈ {k ′, . . . ,n−zw }. The idea is for the user to contact d = d ′+zw parties, use the pairwise hash to detect which zw
parties are sending corrupted information and decode from the remaining parties. Note that from Staircase codes we get
H(S)= (k ′− zr )α= (k− zw − zr )α= (k−2zr w − zwo − zr o)α
and when contacting d ′ parties each party sends
CC (d ′)
d ′
= (k
′− zr )α
d ′− zr
= (k−2zr w − zwo − zr o)α
d −2zr w − zwo − zr o
units of information. Therefore, the capacity, privacy constraints and minimum communication cost and read costs are
achieved. We need to prove that the hash can be used to catch the corrupted parties with high probability.
The secret s is a symbol drawn from a finite field Fαq for a power of a prime q and an integer parameter α ,
LCM(n− zw − zr , . . . ,k − zw − zr +1) of Staircase codes. Staircase code requires dividing each share wi into α symbols,
wi 1, . . . ,wiα. We group the symbols of wi into n−k+1 vectors each of size γ`,αk+`−1−αk+` for `= n−k+1, . . . ,0 (take
αn+1 = 0), such that a user contacting d parties downloads the first group of symbols wi`, `= n−k+1, . . . ,d−k+1, of size
αd from each party. We view each symbol wi` as a vector over some finite field F
γ`
q1 . We construct the following hashes
hi` = (〈wi`,w j`) for all i 6= j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. Each party i stores α symbols wi` and α hash symbols hi` for `= n−k+1, . . . ,0.
Note that wi` ∈ Fqv1 , whereas h` ∈ Fq1 which can be made arbitrarily small. Therefore we assume that the size of the hash
is negligible compared to the size of the secret.
Assume for now that James can neither observe nor corrupt the hash. We will show in the next Section how the hash can be
made secure and private from James. A user contacting d parties, reads and downloads the first αd ,
(k−2zr w − zwo − zr o)α
d −2zr w − zwo − zr o
symbols from each share and the corresponding hashes. Assume without loss of generality that the first zwo + zr w parties
are controlled by the adversary. The user concatenates the downloaded hashes of each share into one vector hi and
computes hˆi using the shares he downloaded to constructs the hash comparison table given in Table II. A X means that
the computed hash matches the downloaded hash and a × means the opposite.
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Read only Write Honest︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷
hˆ1 · · · hˆzr o hˆzr o+1 · · · hˆzr o+zr w+zwo hˆzr o+zr w+zwo+1 · · · hˆd
h1 X · · · X X · · · X X · · · X
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
hzr o X · · · X X · · · X X · · · X
hzr o+1 X · · · X X · · · X × ·· · ×
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
hzr o+zr w+zwo X · · · X X · · · X × ·· · ×
hzr o+zr w+zwo+1 X · · · X × ·· · × X · · · X
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
hd X · · · X × ·· · × X · · · X
Table II: The hash comparison table assuming that the first zr o + zwo + zr w parties are controlled by the adversary.
As long as the number of columns in the green part of the table is greater than the number of columns in the red part
the user can successfully detect which parties are sending corrupted data. The number of columns in the green part is
d − zr w − zwo − zr o and the number of columns in the red part is zr w + zwo . Therefore, the adversary has to introduce
errors orthogonal to at least f = d −2zr w −2zwo − zr o > 1 columns. Thus the probability of error is bounded by
Pr(error)= Pr(flipping f “×” to “X”)
= Pr(e⊥wi1 )Pr(e⊥wi2 |e⊥wi1 ) · · ·Pr(e⊥wi f |e⊥wi1 , . . . ,e⊥wi f −1 )
≤ Pr(e⊥wi1 )
(a)=
(
qγ`−11
qγ`1
)n−d+1
= 1
qn−d+11
.
The equality (a) follows because by construction each wi consists of the concatenation of n−d +1 independent vectors
of size γ` each. Therefore the adversary wants to find n−d +1 error vectors, each being orthogonal to the corresponding
part of wi . The probability of finding such a vector is the probability of finding a vector that lies in the space of dimension
qγ`−1 orthogonal to the corresponding part of wi .
2) Securely Storing the Hash: We show how to store the has securely and privately from the adversary and analyze
the overhead required to store the hash. Recall that each party stores n−k+1 hash vectors hi`, `= n−k+1, . . . ,0. We
slightly modify the creation of the hash. For each value of ` we create h` = (〈wi`,w j`〉) for all n 6= j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. Note
that this h` is indeed the concatenation of the hashes created in the previous section. We encode each h` using an
(n,kh = zr o + zr w +1, zh = zr o + zr w ) secret sharing code and distributed the resulting shares to the parties.
a) Privacy and security of the hash: As a result of the use of secret sharing the values of the hash are private
from an adversary observing any zr = zh shares. We want to show that a user contacting d parties can obtain the
correct values of the hash vectors. The user downloads any kh shares of the hash secret sharing code. Out of these
kh shares at most zw = zwo + zr w values are corrupted by James. The minimum distance of the hash secret sharing is
dmin = n−kh +1 = n− zr o − zr w +1 > zr w + zwo +2, because n ≥ k > 2zr w + zr o + zwo . Therefore, as a property of secret
sharing, which are maximum distance separable codes, the user can detect any dmin−1> zr w + zwo +1 errors. To that
end, the user checks the
( d
kh
)
possible values of the hash shares and decodes from a set that has no errors. Note that
since d ≥ k > 2zr w + zr o + zwo = kh + zr w + zwo −1 there is always a set of kh uncorrupted hash shares that the user can
decode from.
b) Rate analysis: We analyze the overhead of storing the hash on the parties. Each vector h` is of length γ`n(n−1)/2
and so is the length of each hash secret share. The total length of the hash secret shares stored on one parties is∑
`γ`n(n−1)/2=αn(n−1)/2 over Fq1 . Therefore, the overhead of the hash vectors is equal to
log
(
qαn(n−1)/21
q vα1
)
= n(n−1)
2v
.
The overhead of the hash can be made arbitrarily small by increasing v .
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c) Reducing the hash overhead: While computing the hash values we assumed that we want to cross check the
information sent from party i with all the other n−1 parties so that the user can find a set of k− zw parties that have
sent consistent information to the user. This assumption lead to the overhead of hash being n(n−1)/2.
First observe that we can model this problem using a graph. The parties are represented using n vertices. An edge is
drawn between a pair of vertices i and j if there exists a hash value hi , j comparing the consistency of the information
sent from parties i and j . In our initial setting we assumed that the graph is a complete graph. When downloading
information from d parties, the user looks at the subgraph induced by the vertices corresponding to the contacted parties.
The user compares the computed hashes to the downloaded hashes and deletes all the edges where the computed hash
is different from the downloaded hash. The goal of the user is to find a connected component of size d − zw representing
the parties that sent uncorrupted information. We showed that this is possible with high probability when the graph is a
complete graph.
To reduce the overhead of the hash, notice that the graph on n vertices must only be connected. Therefore, a user
contacting any d parties can look at the induced subgraph on the d vertices corresponding to the contacted parties
and repeat the same process described above. It can be shown that a graph on n vertices is connected almost surely if
a vertex i is connected to a vertex j 6= i , j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, with probability p = (log(n)+ log(log(n)))/n. Let N (i ) be the set
of vertices connected to vertex i , we have E|N | = log(n)+ log(log(n)). Thus, in our setting, each hash vector becomes
h` = (〈wi ,w j 〉) for all i = 1, . . . ,n, j =N (i ). This reduces the hash overhead to
n(log(n)+ log(log(n))
v
.
B. Omniscient Adversary
Capacity achieving codes that achieve minimum communication and read costs for this case are based on Staircase
codes [10]. To construct an (n,k,z) R-CE-SS code, we need an (n,k ′ = k−2zw , z = zr ) Staircase code. that achieves minimum
read and communication costs for all d ′ ∈∆ where ∆= {k−2zw , . . . ,n−2zw }. The idea is for the user to contact d = d ′+2zw
parties and correct the worst case errors. Note that from Staircase codes we get
H(S)= (k ′− zr )α= (k−2zw − zr )α= (k−3zr w −2zwo − zr o)α
and when contacting d ′ parties each party sends
CC (d ′)
d ′
= (k
′− zr )α
d ′− zr
= (k−3zr w −2zwo − zr o)α
d −3zr w −2zwo − zr o
units of information. Therefore, the capacity, privacy constraints and minimum communication cost and read costs are
achieved. Since Staircase codes can be viewed as a collection of concatenated Reed-Solomon codes, the error correction
capability of those codes follow immediately from the error correction capability of Reed-Solomon codes.
VII. CONCLUSION
We studied communication efficient secret sharing schemes that tolerate the presence of malicious parties trying to
actively corrupt the data stored in the distributed system. We assume the knowledge of the adversary is restricted to the
information given to the compromised parties. We show that leveraging the limitation of the knowledge of the adversary
allows an increase in the size of the shared secret. We use flow graph representation of the R-CE-SS setting to characterize
the capacity, i.e., maximum size of the secret that can be shared, when the adversary has limited and full knowledge
of the shared information. We also characterize the minimum amount of information, as a function of the number of
stragglers, needed to to be read and communicated to a legitimate user to decode the secret. We construct codes that
achieve capacity in both settings. In addition, the constructed codes achieve minimum read and communication costs
for any number of stragglers, up to a given threshold. Our codes are based on Staircase codes previously introduced for
communication efficient secret sharing and the use of a pairwise hashing scheme used in distributed data storage and
network coding settings to detect the presence of a limited knowledge adversary.
Open problem: Our main motivation for studying secret sharing stems from its application to several other settings. One
can prove that the capacity of distributed storage system, private information retrieval and minimum communication cost
of distributed computing are the same. However, it is not clear how to extended R-CE-SS codes to work in the other
settings. For instance, in private information retrieval, the hash used by the user must be a function of the stored data
(to be retrieved) as well as the encoding scheme used to retrieve the data. A similar argument holds for distributed
computing.
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APPENDIX
We denote the data sent from party i to the user by yi and the corresponding random variable by Yi . Since the user
must be able to decode the secret from any collection of Yi of size d , we have H(S|Y d1 )= 0. Following the same steps of
Section V-A we write
H(S)= I (S;Y d1 ) (23)
= I (S;Y zw1 )+ I (S;Y dzw+1|Y
zw
1 ) (24)
= I (S;Y dzw+1|Y
zw
1 ) (25)
=H(Y dzw+1|Y
zw
1 )−H(Y dzw+1|S,Y
zw
1 )
=H(Y dzw+zr+1|Y
zw
1 )
+H(Y zw+zrzw+1 |Y
zw
1 ,Y
d
zw+zr+1)−H(Y dzw+1|S,Y
zw
1 ) (26)
≤H(Y dzw+zr+1) (27)
≤ (d −2zr w − zwo − zr o)H(Yi ) (28)
= (d −2zr w − zwo − zr o)β. (29)
Equation (24) follows from the chain rule of mutual information. Equation (25) follows from the privacy constraint
given in (1). In (25) we removed the first zr o shares which does not incur loss of generality. Equation (26) follows from
the chain rule of entropy. Equation (27) follows from the data processing inequality as we shall show next. Equation (28)
follows from the chain rule of entropy and (29) follows because H(Yi )=β.
To show that (27) holds we use the non-negativity of the entropy and write the following.
H(Y dzw+1|S,Y
zw
1 )=H(Y zw+zrzw+1 |S,Y
zw
1 )+H(Y dzw+zr |S,Y
zw
1 ,Y
zw+zr
zw+1 )
≥H(Y zw+zrzw+1 |S,Y
zw
1 ). (30)
Let
Q ,H(Y zw+zrzw+1 |Y
zw
1 ,Y
d
zw+zr+1)−H(Y dzw+1|S,Y
zw
1 ),
11
we use (30) to bound Q as follows.
Q ≤H(Y zw+zrzw+1 |Y
zw
1 ,Y
d
zw+zr+1)−H(Y
zw+zr
zw+1 |S,Y
zw
1 )
= I (Y zw+zrzw+1 ;S,Y
zw
1 )− I (Y zw+zrzw+1 ;Y
zw
1 ,Y
d
zw+zr+1) (31)
≥ 0. (32)
Equation (31) follows from the definition of mutual information I (A;B) = H(A)−H(A|B) and (32) holds because
S →W dzw+zr+1 → Y dzw+zr+1 forms a Markov chain and we can use the data processing inequality.
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